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Service Dependability with Continuously Revised
Assurance Cases by Multiple Stakeholders: A Case Study
Kimio Kuramitsu1,a)
Abstract: Recently, assurance cases have received much attentions in the field of software-based computer systems
and IT services. However, software very often changes and there are no strong regulations for software. These facts
are main two challenges to be addressed in software assurance cases. We propose a development method of assurance
cases by means of continuous revision at every stage of the system lifecycle, including in-operation and service recov-
ery in failure cases. The quality of dependability arguments are improved by multiple stakeholders who check with
each other. This paper reported our experience of the proposed method in a case of the ASPEN education service. The
case study demonstrate that the continuos updates create a significant amount of active risk communications between
stakeholders. This gives us a promising perspective for the long-term improvement of service dependability with the
lifecycle assurance cases.
Keywords: Service dependability, Lifecycle management, Assurance cases, and DevOps
1. Introduction
Assurance cases are documentation-based engineering with
structured arguments on the safety and dependability. Originally,
assurance cases have been developed in the field of safety engi-
neering for public transportation and industrial plant, and have
been broadly adopted as a documentation standard to regula-
tors [3]. The regulators especially in EU countries have made the
assessment of assurance cases and then approved the developed
system prior to its operation.
Recently, due to the increased demands of the safety and de-
pendability in software, many developers are interested in the
application of assurance cases for software. However, software
often changes over time, and even needs to change after the ap-
proval of the regulation. The emerging style of the DevOps [23]
development suggests that it would be difficult to separate devel-
opment from the service operations. These natures make it diffi-
cult for a regulator to asses assurance cases, thereby resulting in
the absence of strong regulators for software in general.
We propose a new development method of assurance cases for
software-based IT services. The proposed method are based on
two main ideas: lifecycle maintenance and stakeholder cross-
reviewing.
First, our aim for the use of assurance cases is to share depend-
ability arguments between multiple stakeholders (e.g., develop-
ers, operators, and even users). We attempt to maintain assurance
cases throughout a broader perspective of lifecycle including both
development and operation. Naturally, we allow multiple stake-
holders to revise assurance cases even in the post-development
phases.
The absence of strong regulator is another challenge in terms
1 Graduate School of Computer Engineering, Yokohama National Univer-
sity, 79-1 Tokiwadai, Hodogaya-ku, Yokohama 240–8501 JAPAN
a) kimio@ynu.ac.jp
of transferring high confidence with software assurance cases. To
improve the confidence, we integrate a mechanism of several in-
centives to avoid faulty claims and evidence. The mechanism of
incentives is based on the use of accountability concept with the
rebuttals and cross-reviewing.
This paper reports our experimental experience on the devel-
opment of the ASPEN online education system and its assur-
ance cases. Multiple stakeholders, including developers, opera-
tors, and users, have participated into dependability arguments to
avoid system failures. The arguments were written in GSN [18],
a standard notation of assurance cases, and were shared to each
others. During the experimental period of the ASPEN service,
service failures unfortunately occurred although we made many
extensive efforts with assurance cases, but the analysis of the fail-
ures gives us interesting insights.
In summary, findings throughout the experiment include:
• The initial cost for training stakeholders involved is not prob-
lematic,
• Assurance cases make all stakeholders explicitly convince
the dependability,
• Dependability arguments grow even after the service is in
operation,
• Reviewing by competing experts is strong and practical
enough to check the faulty arguments
We conclude that assurance cases are a practical method in
software-based IT services as to transfer dependability arguments
from one stakeholder to the others through the lifecycle. We
consider that such transferring is an important missing part for
the long-term dependability of ever-changing software-based sys-
tems.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 is an intro-
duction of assurance cases. Section 3 presents our basic ideas to
develop assurance cases for software. Section 4 describes the AS-
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Figure 1 Argument structure of assurance cases
PEN project. Section 5 examines the assurance cases that is de-
veloped in the ASPEN project. Section 6 discusses lesson learnt.
Section 7 reviews related work. Section 8 concludes the paper.
2. What is Assurance Cases?
Assurance cases are document-based engineering with struc-
tured arguments on the safety and the dependability. In this paper,
we use the term dependability in a broader sense of the safety [1].
The documents are structured for transferring the dependability
confidence of products and services to others such as regulators
and third-party organizations. To make the explicit the confi-
dence, assurance cases are usually argued in a form of Claim-
Argument-Evidence. Figure 1 illustrates the conceptual structure
of assurance cases with the CAE arguments.
Let us suppose a claim, for example, that a system is ade-
quately dependable to operate in a given context. The argument
explains the available evidence, showing how it reasonably sup-
ports the claim. The top-most claim is decomposed into a series
of sub-claims until these can be solved with evidence. Since the
arguments make explicit the rational for the claim, they are more
rigorous, justified, defensible, and transparent.
Due to the high transparency of dependability arguments, as-
surance cases generally serves as an efficient risk communication
tool between organizations. However, the most practically used
scenario is transferring the developer’s confidence to a regulator
or a third-party company to assess the conformance of depend-
ability regulations [8]. Through this assessment mechanism, the
regulator forces the developer’s product to meet their regulations,
and then the users trust the developer’s product due to the regula-
tor’s authority.
In contrast, the self-assessment of conformance or the absence
of dependability regulations makes assurance cases self-righteous
and their confidence weaken, resulting in an impractical case.
3. Argumentation Architecture
This section describes our ideas on how we use assurance cases
software-based IT systems where there exists no strong regulator.
3.1 Sharing Dependability Arguments
Our initial motivation comes from the risk of mis-
communications between stakeholders such as developers
and operators, who separately act in the distinct phases of the
lifecycle. In other words, limitations discussed at the devel-
opment time are quite useful for operators to deliver correct
services, but they are unseen at the operation time. On the
contrary, discussions at the operation time can be useful feed-
backs for further development. Sharing such discussions focused
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on the dependability are extensively demanded to improve the
long-term dependability of the products and services.
Our aim for the use of assurance cases is sharing dependabil-
ity arguments between stakeholders throughout the lifecycle. As
introduced in Section 2, the arguments are well structured, and
are more easy to convince the confidence due to the supporting
evidence. This would suggest that assurance cases serve as a
good foundation for sharing the focused knowledge, as well as
risk communications.
The argumentation architecture needs to slightly change when
we attempt to apply it from one stakeholder-to-another to many-
to-many stakeholders. First, the top claim must be a common
goal and assumptions that are shared among all stakeholders. We
decompose the common claim into sub-claims in a way that each
stakeholder can separately lead the his or her acting parts of de-
pendability arguments.
The top claim is decomposed by stages in the lifecycle of
products and services and then we decompose each stage claim
by stakeholders if multiple acting stakeholders exist in the same
stage. Each stakeholder has to provide available evidence that
supports dependability claims that are part of the common goal.
Staging in the lifecycle varies from project to project, but we
refer to the following stages in this paper.
• Planing stage (requirement elicitation and architecting )
• Development stage (coding and testing)
• Operation stage (service design and failure recovery)
• Evolution stage (change accommodation).
Note that the stage decomposition above is based on the
open system dependability [23], which we have proposed in
JST/DEOS project. The uniqueness is the Evolution stage, where
all stakeholders argue the continuously improvement of services
beyond the lifetime of a single operated system.
3.2 Accountability, Rebuttals, and Revised
Currently, most software-based IT services run under no regu-
lation. As described in Section 2, the absence of strong regulators
may reduce the practicality of assurance cases. This is a challenge
to be avoided in practice.
The first idea is the use of the accountability concept [10]; ac-
countability is widely used to build trust and reputation among
competing individuals and organizations by exposing failures. In
contexts of assurance cases, we can integrate the accountability
concept by recording the stakeholder identity at every element of
assurance cases. That is, the stakeholder identity can be used to
trace who claims or who gives faulty evidence when a problem
2
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occurs. In general, this results in strong incentives to avoid faulty
claim and evidence.
In addition to the stakeholder accountability, we include a form
of rebuttal into the dependability arguments. In contexts of as-
surance cases, the rebuttal means a challenge for the claim or an
objection against the evidence, usually noted in the review pro-
cess. In the assessment process, the rebuttals do not remain since
they need to be solved prior to the certification. In the absence
case of a regulator, the rebuttal is not so strong to enforce the
modification. Unsolved rebuttals are regarded as conflicts. If the
conflicts remain between stakeholders, the claim containing the
rebuttal is in total regarded as the stakeholder agreements. Note
that the rebuttals are recorded with the stakeholder identity for its
accountability.
Based on the recorded rebuttals, we use the cross-reviewing
between stakeholders instead of the third-party reviewer, since
stakeholders in part compete with each other (e.g., a developer
wants reduced costs in the development but this is a potential risk
to improper developed systems for others.) A faulty claim of-
ten becomes a potential risk for other stakeholders. Naturally,
non-rebuttal claims are regarded as approved by all stakeholders
with some sharable responsibility when a problem occurs. This
also leads to another incentives to voluntarily make rebuttals for
other’s claim and evidence. Figure 2 illustrates our proposed ar-
gumentation architecture with lifecycle decomposition and stake-
holder identities.
More importantly, recall that our aim is to facilitate sharing
dependability arguments between stakeholders, not to facilitate
competition with each others. The developers and the operators
can change software or service operations if they agree on given
rebuttals. In addition, they are also allowed to revise the related
assurance cases if their practice is changed. This makes an itera-
tive process, which enables us to better capture the ever-changing
nature of software and would result in the dependability mainte-
nance of changed software.
Note that we assume that all revised versions of assurance
cases are referable by a proper version control system.
4. ASPEN Project
The ASPEN project is organized in the part of the JST/DEOS
project in order to investigate the development method of assur-
ance cases in reality. The ASPEN project includes not only as-
surance cases developed across different organizations, but also
the development and the service operation of the ASPEN online
education with our industrial partners. This section describes the
experimental settings in the ASPEN project.
4.1 System and Service Overview
ASPEN is an online education system, which provides exer-
cises on programming to students through the Web. Figure 3 is
the overview of the ASPEN service. The students write code for
assignments, and run it on the Web browser, and then submit it
through a Web browser. The submitted assignments are stored
on the ASPEN server, and subject to the university grading by an
instructor.
ASPEN is not a safety-critical system in such areas that assur-
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Figure 3 ASPEN overview
ance cases have been mainly developed so far. However, ASPEN
involves several dependability attributes [1] that are commonly
required in a wide class of software-based IT services.
• Availability – The service will always be available to the
users (i.e., students).
• Reliability – No hardware or software failures occur during
provision of the service.
• Integrity – Programming assignments supplied by the owner
do not disappear.
• Privacy – Personal information is not disclosed to unautho-
rized parties.
4.2 Stakeholders
The earlier ASPEN was a small system that had been devel-
oped and operated for those studying in Yokohama National Uni-
versity. Several instructors had demanded to use the ASPEN in
his or her class, and we planed to deliver the ASPEN service.
At the same time, the dependability of the ASPEN system was
a crucial issue for the instructors. To convince it we organized
the co-development of assurance cases in parts of the JST/DEOS
project. We contracted the development and the service operation
with two different firms.
Here is a list of the stakeholders who were involved in the AS-
PEN project. In terms of the accountability, the stakeholder iden-
tity must be a personal name, but we identify them by the role
name for readability.
• Owner – the author
• Developer – a programmer working for an software devel-
opment firm
• Operator – a system engineer with more that 10 year experi-
ences on Web-based service operations
• Users – instructors and university students (i.e., those
granted ASPEN access)
Note that the user that participated the dependability arguments
is an instructor working for different institute from the authors’.
4.3 Goal Structuring Notation
In the ASPEN project, we use Goal Structuring Notation [18]
to share assurance cases between stakeholders. The GSN notation
is a standard argumentation notation of assurance cases in safety-
critical industries. The GSN notation consists of four principle
elements, goal (depicted in rectangle), strategy (parallelogram),
evidence (oval), and context (rounded rectangle), as shown in
3
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 Figure 4 GSN Elements
Figure 5 AssureNote: a Web-based GSN authoring tool
Figure 4. The goal element is used to state a claim that a sys-
tem certainly has some desirable properties, such as safety and
dependability. The evidence element is some piece of materials
to support that the linked claim is true. The goal without linked
evidence is called undeveloped.
As in CAE, a goal is decomposed into sub-goals until a point
is reached where claims can be supported by direct reference to
available evidence. The strategy element is used to state a reason
for claim decomposition. The context element is used to state an
assumption (the system scope and the assumed properties). There
is no special support for state the rebuttal. We regard the context
element linked to the evidence as the rebuttal element.
In the experiment, we use AssureNote [22], an Web-based au-
thoring tool that allows multiple users to share the GSN document
through the Web. Figure 5 is a screen shot of AssureNote. In As-
sureNote, all GSN elements are automatically recorded with the
user identity under the version control of GSN elements.
4.4 Development Procedure
In the experiment, we attempt the development of assurance
cases in parallel with the development and service operation of
the ASPEN system. All written assurance cases and other com-
munications between stakeholders are in Japanese.
In the Planing stage, the owner defines the top claim that in-
cludes dependability goals and assumptions, on which the AS-
PEN is assumed to deliver correct services for the users. Follow-
ing the planning stage, we proceed the ASPEN with the following
procedures:
• The developer claims that the developed system meets the
owner’s dependability goals with supporting evidence.
• The operator, the user, and the owner review the developer’s
claims and make agreements on the conflicted claims.
• The operator, based on the developed system, claims that the
0	  
5	  
10	  
15	  
20	  
25	  
30	  
35	  
40	  
45	  
50	  
Planing	  #2	   Development	  
#52	  
Development	  
Agreement	  #22	  
Service	  Design	  
#27	  
Service	  
Agreement	  #29	  
Failure	  
Recovery	  #35	  
System	  
EvoluBon	  #40	  
N
um
be
r	  o
f	  G
SN
	  E
le
m
en
ts
	
#	  of	  Goals	   #	  of	  Context	   #	  of	  Evidence	   #	  of	  RebuIal	  
Figure 6 Growth of assurance cases in GSN elements
operated system meet the owner’s dependability goals with
supporting evidence.
• The developer, the user, and the owner review the operator’s
claims and make agreements on the conflicted claims.
• Any stakeholder can revise the assurance cases if they find
any insufficiency and defeats.
As shown the above, we focus on the dependability related is-
sues and avoid the general issues on software implementations
and operation procedures. When we resolve the conflicted claims
caused by rebuttals, we ask all stakeholders to meet together on
the same place and then make agreements on the conflicts.
5. ASPEN Cases
The ASPEN cases have been developed with a method that we
have proposed in Section 3 and 4. This section reports how the ar-
guments are organized with a fragmentation of GSNs, excerpted
from the developed assurance cases.
5.1 Overview
First, we overview the statistics of the ASPEN cases. As we
described in Section 4.3, the ASPEN cases are written in GSN.
We first gave the top goal that was decomposed into the Develop-
ment stage, the Service stage, and Evolution Stage with common
assumptions. The GSNs were revised 40 times throughout the
ASPEN project. Here we use #n to represent the n-th revision.
The GSN document grew from 4 elements (at #1) to 134 elements
(at #40). We identify the major revisions as follows:
• #2 Initial Requirement
• #12 Development
• #22 Development Agreement
• #27 Service design
• #29 Service Agreement
• #35 Failure recovery
• #40 Service evolution
Figure 6 shows the growth of the ASPEN cases in the number
of GSN elements: goals, contexts, evidences, and rebuttals. The
increase of contexts suggests the reduced ambiguity of the goals
and the increase of evidence suggest the reduced uncertainty in
dependability.
In the remainder of this section we close up the development
agreement (#2-#20), the service agreement (#27-#29), the failure
recovery (#35), and system evolution (#40).
4
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Figure 7 Example of a rebuttal by the operator’s review (G12: The data
never lose. Unillustrated in the figure.) S8.2: Arguing over type
of data storage. G22: The submitted program data by the students
never lose. E22.1: The program data is stored the git repository.
Operator agreement: periodical backups are necessary. C22.2:
*Rebuttal* Lack of data backups. C23: The student activity data
never lose. E23.1: The student activity is stored on the syslog
storage. Tested by ...
5.2 Development Agreement
The developer started the argument with a claim ”ASPEN is
dependable”, and decomposed it into sub-claims by dependabil-
ity attributes (c.f., ASPEN is available, integral, safe, etc). The
forms of evidence that the developer provided were mostly other
external experience reports (collected from the Internet). Some
goals remained the lack of evidence. Note that lack of evidence
does not directly mean lack of dependability, but it does mean
that uncertainty about dependability.
Figure 7 illustrates the fragment of developer’s claim on that
the software is integral in the data storage. One could consider
that the evidence E22.1 was not reasonable evidence to support
the claim G22. Likewise, the operator pointed out a risk of the
hardware failure of disk storage. However there was no time
enough to change the storage architecture. Instead, the opera-
tor agreed on the failure mitigation at the operation time. Finally,
the operator made 9 rebuttals for the developer’s claim prior to
the operations.
Note that throughout the experiment we use the term ”risk”
instead of ”rebuttal” to make it easier for participants to make
rebuttals.
5.3 Service Agreement
In the operation stage, we focus only on the failure mitiga-
tion and failure recovery. The operator led the arguments as the
domain stakeholder and used the failure avoidance pattern that
consists of two parts:
• the symptom of a failure is detectable (by monitoring)
• the detected symptom is mitigated before the service stop-
ping
The completeness of failure avoidance analysis is important
but not pursued in the experimentation in part because we want
to measure the iterative effects of assurance cases during the op-
erations.
Figure 8 is a fragment of assurance cases arguing the server’s
availability. Note that some parameters embedded are parameters
for operation scripts [20]. One could consider that the evidence
is questionable but the user (and the owner) trusted the opera-
tor’s claim with no doubt due to his expertise. They did not make
any rebuttals against the operator, except for an explicit help-desk
support in cases of service troubles.
5.4 Failure Recovery
We encountered several service failures while we run the AS-
PEN service. Since unexpected failures means the insufficient ar-
guments of failure mitigations, the operator revised the assurance
cases based on stakeholder agreements.
Here we highlight a sever down failure, occurred in the middle
of the classroom. This failure appeared only when students used
ASPEN at the classroom. The system monitor indicated that the
server operating system is unexpectedly down. At first, the op-
erator suspected that there exists unknown bugs in the ASPEN
system. Unfortunately, the developer found some bugs that might
be related to the server down. This is however a wrong way to re-
cover the service. Three weeks later, the operator found an awful
fact that the increase of traffic was unexpectedly fast, so that the
servers could not scale out.
In assurance cases, the claim ”the servers can scale out” was
apparently self-rightours. The operator never tested in any actual
traffic for evidence. However, no body pointed out that this claim
is insufficient. After the problem occurred, the operator recog-
nized that the scale-out approach was incapable of handling 40
classroom student access. The operator asked the instructor for
all students not to access at the same time, although the instructor
requested the operator to increase the servers as they had claimed
on the assurance cases.
Another serious problem has been found later in the context of
top goal, which describes common assumptions on the ASPEN
service. Originally, the ASPEN service is assumed for 100 stu-
dents to submit their assignments from home computers. On this
assumption, the maximum simultaneous access was estimated at
most 5. The number of students in the class room seems fewer
than 100 students, but the density of access traffic differs from
the estimation. That is, there is a bug at the top goal assumption.
The service was at last recovered by the increased server re-
sources specially for the classroom use.
5.5 System Evolution
The ASPEN project run two years. In the second year, we
evolved the ASPEN system, based on the analysis of service fail-
ures and the users’ demands in the first year. The resulting evolu-
tion includes:
• the adoption of the available open source solution such as
Moodle to reduce in-house development
• Transitioned computing environment to the Amazon Web
Services (a standard cloud computing platform)
At the same time, we attempted to argue this system evolution
based on the assurance cases. This is mainly because the ASPEN
project was organized in parts of the JST/DEOS project, where
5
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Figure 8 Example of arguments on failure avoidance in operation: G10: Symptom of service failure is
detectable as anomalies (measurable errors). S8.2: Arguing over type of errors. G25: Network
traffic over the assumption is detectable. C25.1: The number of the assumed users is 5 at the
same time. C25.2: *Rebuttal* Exceeding the assumption E25.3: Zabbix integrated monitor-
ing tool is installed. G26: CPU overload is detectable. C26.1: CPU overload is defined by a
threshold w > 10. E26.2: The CPU load average is monitored. G27: Data loss is detectable.
the long-term dependability beyond the lifetime of each single
system is a focused issue to be addressed. This attempt however
let us recognize how difficult to organize the argument structure
from scratch since the arguments on the development and the op-
eration relies on the argument patterns.
We could not draw two system evolutions as reasonable con-
clusions from the claim such that the system evolution is required.
On the other hand, we could claim that two system evolutions
make more dependable in terms of availability and usability.
6. Lesson Learnt and Discussions
This section describes lessons we learnt throughout the exper-
iment and discuss the perspective of assurance cases in software-
based IT services.
6.1 Development Costs
(Lesson 1). The initial training costs for introducing assurance
cases is not problematic.
For all the participants, the concept of assurance cases was new
in such a way that they first suspected the benefits of assurance
cases. We gave them about one-hour technical lecture on the GSN
notation (not the concept of assurance cases itself). This short
lecture is helpful enough to join dependability arguments in the
project. No one had difficulty in reading the GSN documents. As
a result, the training cost is not a primary issue for introducing
the GSN-based arguments.
(Lesson 2). Argument patterns guide the well-structured argu-
ments.
Designing the structure of dependability arguments is acknowl-
edged to be difficult in [3]. We gave prepared several patterns
for dependability arguments, which come mainly from the aca-
demic resources in [1]. The participants were naturally guided
to proven structure of arguments such as dependability attributes
(e.g., reliability and integrity) and fault analysis. On the other
hand, the system evolution could not be patterned before the de-
velopment of assurance cases, since we did not have good refer-
ence to the system evolution in the literature. The resulting ar-
guments seemed to be distractive in terms of the structures. The
usefulness of argument patters is confirmed.
(Lesson 3). Providing evidence is the most costy part.
The hardest part of developing assurance cases is a collection
of supporting evidence. In part because the assurance cases are
new for both the developers and the operators, they did not pre-
pare any forms of evidence even if they claim them in the goals of
the assurance case. For example, the developers preformed many
functional tests as usual, but the tested results are far from those
requested in the non-functional arguments. Both the developers
and the operators don’t want spend extra resources for evidence,
the way of effective evidence transformation is still an open ques-
tion.
6.2 Continuous Revision
We examine the lifecycle revision of assurance cases. It is hard
to evaluate how the dependability is improved from this single
case study, but we can make a distinction from the traditional
development of assurance cases. As shown in Figure 6, the in-
creased number of GSN elements suggests a fact that there are
many lacked arguments at the development phase from view-
points of the users who want service dependability. Continuous
revision can follow up such lacked arguments even while the ser-
vice is in operation. Note that a fact that our development is not
intensively assessed suggests that we may drop many necessary
6
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arguments prior to the service operation. We need furthermore
investigations.
(Lesson 4). Rebuttal is an enforced communication vehicle be-
tween stakeholders.
Another finding is that rebuttals made at the design stage can
be a source of the hazard analysis at the operation time. First,
we consider that the operator’s rebuttal makes the developer’s re-
sponsibility explicit for the claimer if the related system failure
happens. However, it was an unrealistic idea that the developer
takes all responsibilities if there are annotated rebuttals on their
evidence. Rather, some rebuttals are available at the failure miti-
gation of the next stage. The rebuttals are used as such a serious
communication vehicle between stakeholders.
6.3 Cross-Reviewing and Its Quality
We introduce the cross-reviewing between competing stake-
holders an alternative solution to a regulator or a third-party as-
sessment. We measure the reviewing activities by the number of
revisions:
• 10 revisions for the development review
• 2 revisions for the operation review
The development review is more vigorous than the operation
review. The difference comes from the reviewers’ expertise.
The developer and the operator apparently compete with each
other in a such way that poorly developed systems can make it
for the operator difficult to operate. In reality, the operator in-
dicated several defeats of evidence given by the developer. The
operator never agreed with the lack of evidence, and often re-
quested for too much evidence that almost exceeds the capability
of the developer. In many cases, the owner needed to coordinate
their conflicts. Without the coordinator we don’t convince that
they reached agreements. The quality of assurance cases are im-
proved, as indicated by the growth of GSN elements.
(Lesson 5). Dependability guidelines, even not as strong as
regulations, are demanded to make agreements in cases of con-
flicts.
The operators and the users has the similar competing relation-
ship, but the users couldn’t suggest any weakness of service oper-
ations that is documented in assurance cases. This is mainly due
to the lack of knowledge for system operations; the user trusted
the operator’s claim and evidence. However, this was not lucky
for the operator since the user strongly requested the fulfillment
of the operator’s claims in cases of failures. Apparently, the strict
review is better than the failure payoff.
(Lesson 6). Expert judgements are required in the review pro-
cess.
In conclusion, continuously revised assurance cases create ac-
tive risk communications between stakeholders on the evidence
basis. We consider that this approach leads to the long-term im-
provement of service dependability.
7. Related Work
Our work builds on existing many excellent ideas for assur-
ance cases, particularly based on assurance representations such
as CAE [3] and GSN [14, 18], lifecycle developments [9, 23], ar-
gument patterns [11, 24], and reviewing arguments [17, 25]. The
use of accountability (with stakeholder identity) is a little spice
for the lifecycle maintenance of assurance cases.
Recently there has been increasing interest in the use of assur-
ance cases in software-based assurance. Boomfield and Bishop
[3] discussed the current practice of safety and assurance cases
for software-based systems. Graydon et al. [9] proposed an
approach to integrating assurance into the development process
by co-developing the software system and its assurance case.
Hawkins et al extensibly study the assurance aspect of software
process [12] and software evolution [15].
Since the modern software is well modeled in design, there has
been increasing interest in the model-driven approach to the de-
velopment of software assurance case. Denney and Pai shows an
automated assembly from a lightweight formal models of soft-
ware development [5, 6]. Hawkins et al [13] shows how to gen-
erate an assurance argument for a system using information ex-
tracted directly from design, analysis and development models of
that system.
Assurance information needs to be kept confidential in safety-
critical systems [2]. This leads to the very limited research ma-
terials for researchers. Recently, due to the increased research
attention in assurance cases, many excellent practice reports have
been published in the literature. The major reports include un-
manned aircraft [4], automobile (ISO26262) [21], autonomous
vehicle and aircraft safety critical software [11], generic infusion
pump [19], pacemaker [16], health IT service [7]. Our experience
is a largely manual development and perhaps not well organized
due to the lack of the base regulation but unique in terms of gen-
eral software-based IT services.
8. Conclusion
Recently, assurance cases have received much attentions in the
field of software-based computer systems and IT services. How-
ever, software very often changes and there are no strong regula-
tions for software. These facts are considered to two challenges to
be addressed in software assurance cases. We propose a develop-
ment method by means of continuous revision for assurance cases
at every stage of the system lifecycle, including in-operation and
service recovery in failure cases. Instead of regulator, multiple
stakeholders check dependability goals and their supporting ev-
idence with each other. This paper reported our experience of
the proposed method in a case of the ASPEN education service.
The case study demonstrate that the continuos updates create a
significant amount of active risk communications between stake-
holders. This gives us the promising perspective for the long-term
improvement of service dependability with the continuously up-
dated assurance cases. At the same time, it is hard to draw a
definitive conclusion from one studied case. In future work, we
perform furthermore empirical studies on software and IT ser-
vices and establish dependability assurance guidelines for soft-
ware.
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